

1 November 1951

The Honorable Gordon Gray  
Director, Psychological Strategy Board  
708 Jackson Place, N. W.  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Gordon:

I return herewith the material from Eli Ginsberg which you sent me with your note of 26 October 1951. I have taken a copy of it in order to have an opportunity to give it further study. Father Morlion, whose memorandum he encloses, worked with me in New York during the early days of the war. I have a most favorable impression of him.

Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles

Encl.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD  
WASHINGTON

October 26, 1951

MEMORANDUM TO MR. ALLEN DULLES:

I inclose the material from Eli Ginzberg about which I spoke to you last night. I should appreciate your returning it to me after you have had a chance to read it, as I have not yet acknowledged its receipt.

  
Gordon Gray  
Director



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO:

20 October 1951

Mr. Gordon Gray, Director  
Psychological Strategy Board  
708 Jackson Place  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Gray:

I appreciate the fact that I had an opportunity to talk with you yesterday about my recent trip to SHAPE, EUCOM, and England. My only regret is that in so doing I added to your already tight schedule.

In accordance with our conversation, I am putting down on paper the major points which I reviewed with you. I am dividing my comments into three parts: diagnosis, conclusions, and recommendations.

Re diagnosis:

- a. Germany -- Our desire to get on with the defense of Western Europe has made very bad traders of us in the case of the Germans. We have failed to remember the extent to which all Germany policy is dictated by the sheepest type of opportunism. We have likewise underestimated the extent to which there will always be a pull between West Germany and East Germany. Germany's recovery on the economic front has been remarkable and we are really confronted with a new "German problem". One of the most serious shortcomings of American policy has been our lack of effective relations with the Socialist opposition. The U.S. must look forward to an increasingly difficult problem in Western Europe because of the improved bargaining position of the Germans, who will use their strength to the full.
- b. France -- The whole of French life, political, economic, and social, is frozen. Despite our post-war assistance, we have failed to really win the middle third to our side. All that one can say is that we have not lost them as yet. We did very little for the working classes when we were pouring money in via ECA. Now that we are trying to get the French to accelerate their rearmament program, the already unsatisfactory economic conditions

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of the masses will probably deteriorate. The political implications for the U.S. are obvious. Although most Frenchmen are looking for a "new deal", they have no reason to expect that they can receive one via American effort.

- c. Italy -- If the situation in France is unsatisfactory, that of Italy is definitely dangerous. There is a real chance that the Communists may win a free election. As in France, the government is uninterested or unable, probably both, to tackle effectively important areas where reforms are sorely needed. Even in plants run completely with ECA funds, the government has not prevented Communist trade unionists from getting a stranglehold. The only party that promises the workers anything is the Communist Party. If the Communists should gain a 40 odd percent vote, one must assume that some of the weak politicians will try to join the bandwagon. The situation remains most precarious.
- d. England -- The political situation is of an entirely different order as far as the U.S. is concerned, as compared with Germany, France, and Italy. The British are substantially united and are basically committed to the same values as we are. However, their economy is very taut. One must not overlook the fact that the Scottish trade unions supported Aneurin Bevan. U.S. policy must be careful not to push the British over the economic brink as far as the internal domestic situation is concerned. We may have an option of more loans and more rearmament, or slower rearmament.

Re conclusions:

- a. The U.S. has not become identified in Western Europe with a "new deal" for the masses of the population.
- b. Neither the U.S. nor its democratic allies have an effective personality similar to Stalin. Eisenhower has potentials but not as long as he is on active military duty.
- c. Our overanxiousness to get a German contribution for defense has led to the creation of a new German problem.
- d. As far as France and Italy are concerned, we must be careful that our defense preoccupation does not set the stage for what might be called a "Chinese solution", in which we do a little and not enough and eventually lose the country to our opponents.

- e. We have failed to date to differentiate short- and long-run objectives and have paid insufficient attention to the priority issues under both heads. We should be pushing the French and the Italians much more than we are to mess up their local Communists; on the other hand, we ought to be at work on long-term problems such as Italian unemployment.
- f. The frozen situation in France can give probably only via a series of reforms which are supra-national. Likewise, there is probably no chance of keeping the Germany problem under control except within a broader context of Western European effort. Although the U.S. has begun to push along these lines, there is much more which we can and should do.
- g. There is a lack of effective integration of American effort -- diplomatic, economic, and military. To the extent that there is formal leadership via the ambassadors, we suffer from the historically passive State Department approach.

Recommendations:

- a. It is important to use every means at our disposal, the Catholic Church, trade unions, editors, etc., to correct the picture that most Americans now have that ECA solved the Western European problem. We must get the country prepared for the long pull without permitting it to become too discouraged.
- b. There is the utmost need for organizational and leadership changes to intensify the effectiveness of American effort on the three fronts of diplomatic, economic, and military aid. Care should be taken in such a reform to be sure that there is civilian control rather than military control at the top.
- c. Closely related to the foregoing is the need for some tougher operators in countries where we must seek to push the Communists back rapidly, as in Italy and France. The search for proper personnel who combine diplomatic, military, and psychological strength will admittedly be very difficult.
- d. To the extent that we still retain certain important controls over Germany, we should be careful to hold on to them and not bargain them away foolishly. The Germans should be forced to demonstrate over a considerable period of time that they are really with us before we trust them.

- e. The U.S. should accelerate the support which it has begun to give to French leadership in working toward Western European integration.
- f. It is most important that in all future aid a conscious effort be made to identify what the U.S. is doing in Western Europe with a "new deal" for at least a part of the population. There is no reason why we should not establish minimum labor standards, etc. in our current offshore procurement program. Every action that the U.S. takes should have something positive about it for the local population. In the last analysis we must win this population or we lose everything.

Although I have tried to be as brief as possible, I regret that the letter grew to four pages. But then Western Europe really is quite a problem!

I am enclosing, as you requested I should, a copy of the document prepared by the Vatican group on the Italian situation, which, as I mentioned to you, takes anything but an optimistic point of view. I cannot, however, refrain from commenting on the fact that despite the quite pessimistic appraisal, the solutions recommended -- food packages -- seem hardly adequate. This reemphasizes the fact that the groups that have the most to lose in Western Europe are still looking for a very cheap solution.

Is there anything on paper about the scope and responsibilities of the Psychological Strategy Board? I would be much interested to learn at least a little about the direction of your present efforts.

With kind regards,

Sincerely yours,

Eli Ginzberg  
Consultant

Enclosure

MEMORANDUM OF FATHER MORLION, PRESIDENT OF  
THE INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY "PRO DEO" ROME.

CONCLUSIONS FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION IN FACT OF THE INCREASED  
SOCIAL-COMMUNIST THREAT

Having been called for consultation by heads of the Catholic Apostolate and by responsible Christian Democratic Leaders, I must affirm in the name of our whole staff of specialists in the study of communist psychology, that based upon the experience of the administrative elections held in May and June 1951, the situation is definitely more dangerous in Italy today than in 1948. As described in the full page story of Time Magazine of March 28th, 1949, the Citizens Committee (Comitati Civici) created by the 3,000,000 strong Catholic Action Organization of Italy (Prof. Gedda), made use of the methods of applied psychology and public debates taught in the "Pro Deo" University, in their decisive battle against communism. This seemed to stop the political advance of communism in Italy - strategically the most important country in Europe.

The weekly organ of the "Pro Deo", Ora Dell'Azione (The Hour of Action), which became the organ of the Comitati Civici, documented 105,000 local leaders of propaganda during the decisive battle of 1948 and seemed to have mobilized dormant Christian forces to the extent that the communists themselves admitted they had been licked by superior Catholic propaganda methods. Notwithstanding the clear cases of revolt within the communist party (famous Cucchi-Magnani incident), and the general political skepticism which developed strongly amongst communist masses in 1949 and 1951, the administrative elections of 1951 have been a surprise showing a definite strengthening of the communist socialist bloc.

1). The longrange danger in the increase of communist in Italy - The elections of North Italy held 27th May and June 1951 show (according to the definite figures published by the important independent daily "Tempo") that in the major cities alone the socialist communist bloc has gathered 1,564,667 votes in 1951 against 1,471,808 in the elections of 1948 and 1,245,128 in the administrative elections of 1946. The elections of the 3rd of June 1951 in Sicily are even more impressive; the Socialist-Communist bloc gathered 64,641 in 1951 against 454,088 in 1948 and 591,870 in 1947. The indisputable evidence of the reinforced power of the communist party brings us face to face with a much greater peril than in 1948 with the following consequences:

a). The masses of the left have taken courage again and have embarked on increased propaganda which will permit more dangerous political strikes and pre-revolutionary agitation. Following the setback of 1948 the communists have obeyed the orders from Moscow, creating central, regional and local schools for leaders which as confirmed by the best secret sources, have cost

them in 1950 alone more than 1 1/2 million dollars. They now have many thousands of extremely efficient propagandists who are, as a result of long and careful training, probably superior to the majority of the Christian Democratic propagandists - who only get moving in election time - and Catholic Action men who are not used to methods of infiltration. The communist propagandists are well paid and sell the party papers in every house which is open to their influence, are powerful in every factory, and have spent according to trustworthy estimates in the last three years over 18 million dollars in propaganda. After the strong affirmation of the anti-communist party which obtained absolute majority in 1948, the phenomenon of fear which brought the masses to follow communist leaders might have disappeared. As it is not proved that the socialist-communist bloc has strengthened while the strongest anti-communist party has lost at least 15% of votes, the way is open again to bring many more of the politically undecided workers into the orbit of the numerous communist organizations who have succeeded in impressing the masses as being the most efficient fighters for peace and for social justice.

b). As the bloc of marxist parties represents nearly 40% of the votes, the communist leaders now only need an alliance with about 10% of the voters to form a majority for a new government. Ambitious political leaders of smaller parties will be tempted more and more to join with the leftist bloc to oust the Christian Democratic leaders and it is clear that any government with communist majority would quickly succeed with the well-known so-called democratic methods in creating a marxist dictatorship.

c). The U.S.S.R. can now act with more force knowing that the Italian fifth column, strongest communist party in the world after Russia, is more efficient than ever. The faction in the Polit Buro of Moscow, which bases its arguments for speedy aggression on the assumption that democratic strength in Western Europe is disintegrating, now occupies a stronger position. The grave peril to peace is not so much the idea in Russian minds that the U.S.S.R. possesses the atomic bomb and superior armies, but the idea that Europe can be conquered without any grave resistance by means of sabotage by the Fifth Columns.

2a). There is a basis for optimism based on striking facts regarding the non-communistic ideology of Italian members of the Communist party.

If it were a fact that during the last three years large masses of the people had continued to vote for the communist party as the result of a real Marxist conviction, the realistic conclusion would be that it is now too late to try to divert the masses from communist and socialist parties. Our reason for optimism, however, is based on the true fact that the majority of the workers who follow communist leaders are individualists at heart and are naturally disposed to prefer the principles and practice of individual freedom to this totalitarianism. Italian communism is, in fact, a sentimental reaction rather than a deeply rooted conviction. It is a product of 5 years of very clever deception of the public opinion and the possibility clearly exists that if we act now with intelligence and decision we shall bring the majority of Italians,



who do not really agree with communist doctrines; to get out of the close circle of the Marxist political organization.

b). While the communists have made great efforts to form leaders and propagandists in order to indoctrinate the masses, the religious and democratic forces have stepped up the classes of training schools for anti-communist propagandists, political leaders, and trade unionists, etc. The fact that the "Pro Deo" University accepted during the last 3 years 3,271 subscriptions for the 4 year courses in Rome and gave in addition short courses in applied psychology in 82 regional centers for many thousands of dynamic intellectuals and workers, assures that the longrange mobilization of leaders will be possible.

c). The two most deeply rooted doctrines in the Italian people which can be vitalized by modern means of propaganda to overcome communist pressure are - repugnance of class hatred and a deep religious sentiment.

Probes and inquiries made by the experts of the National University "Pro Deo" in 240 typical groups of workers through Italy have shown that 95% of the people would endorse the following opinion. "We do not want to suppress the rich as we cannot do the job of our employer and director ourselves, but we only want to be paid decently and to see that work be found for all."

During the last year in more than 100 towns and villages about 400,000 communist have listened to our speeches and taken part in debates on the subject of private enterprise. These Communists have demonstrated genuine admiration for manufacturers who have taken commercial risks to raise output and bring more security to their workers and new jobs for the unemployed. Class hatred has not yet found its roots and there is also no hatred for the American people. It would be sufficient to start systematically to broadcast examples of solidarity and justice on the basis of Christian sentiment to create a very strong competition to the superficial communist slogans and anti-Americanism.

Polls made in 1,400 typical circles confirmed that 97% of the workers still believe in God and in the moral rule of the Gospel. Whenever a religious approach is made there is a very sincere response and if the communist masses can be informed patiently and clearly about the atheist nature of communism they can be brought to choose a Christian affirmation of social justice instead of the atheist one.

5). The Methods of applied psychology for immediate action in public opinion. Foreseeing the danger, which is now more decisive than in 1948, the "Pro Deo" specialists have launched in September 1950 a new kind of organ "Unione Popolare" in which workers can write about their concrete problems. This non-political organ has now created deeply rooted sympathies in all communist circles because whereas even in the "Unita" and other communist organs the worker finds articles written about him by journalists (who are practically bourgeois) the "Unione

"Popolare" publishes articles written and signed by authentic workers together with their photographs and objective reports of an inquiry continued in each number on the genuine misery of the most underpaid families: what they eat, how they dress, what they think and what they desire. There are in Italy 30,000 parishes and approximately 60,000 Parish Priests, and this is a type of capillary organization with which even the communists cannot compete. On the basis of this new psychological formula and with the help already provided by the same Christian propagandists who in 1948 have worked in each of the 30,000 parishes we can succeed in creating a real popular movement in competition with the communist myths and propaganda.

a). The first characteristic of the campaign must be a really sensational expression of human solidarity, which fires the imagination of the masses. Up to now the communists have won the first round with their stories and pictures of the communist paradise and have succeeded in making even the gifts of American democracy hateful as being political charity serving to enslave Italian workers to American imperialism and capitalism. In the past, the American gifts and packages have not been very carefully advertised and the masses did not see, in fact, which classes of people were practically saved by this assistance. The new angle which would greatly impress the imagination of the masses is the following: There are 305,000 families with an income of less than 15 dollars per month and there are 1,704,000 families with an income of less than 30 dollars per month. If international Christian and democratic solidarity gets to work in Italy - where exists 40% of all the unemployed in Europe - and furnishes food packages and clothes, etc. - first to the most destitute families - this practical action will have more psychological effect against communism than any other form of propaganda. In fact, communist politicians claim they augment by strikes the wages of the workers in factories and offices. But those workers already earn more than 30 dollars per month. Communism neglects the poorest classes who are not for them the most politically active. A stream of assistance very clearly directed to these now well authenticated cases will soon make social solidarity and does work while communist speeches and strikes have never brought any help to the poorest in Italy.

b). The second characteristic of the campaign must be the building up of numerous personalities to which the sympathies can be directed. Up to now, Stalin and the national communist leaders are for the masses the practical friends of the working men who fight for their rights. This time in each parish there must be one or more Italian working men to take the initiative, through the "Unione Popolare", of working together with non-ideologically convinced communists and maintaining correspondence with foreign individual workers. This correspondence with fellow workers abroad would unite in a way more real than the communist method the proletariat of the other countries. The packages would include photographs and letters from the workers who must represent their fellow workers. The difference between anonymous gifts from a government or gifts from family members or friends abroad and the kind of gift which expresses in an organized way the worker's solidarity is of very great psychological importance.

c). The third characteristic of the campaign must be the permanent contact with, and infiltration into the communist masses. The inquiries to be made in each parish with the help of the parish priest and parish doctor to describe concretely the misery of the most underpaid families is a work which creates constant contact between the Christians and the communist masses. Up to now, the communists themselves have always complained that "the Christians only come to us when it is election time." In fact, this lack of penetration in popular circles in a permanent way has been the greatest error of democrats in Italy. It is an illusion to think that Christians can be brought to contact regularly the communist masses with ideological purposes. In the method of the "Unione Popolare", however, systematic inquiry on the most desperate human cases with a guarantee that concrete help will follow this penetration becomes attractive and easy. Instead of giving a few alms to all those who afterwards are angry because they do not get enough, it is better to find out which families can be saved by one package per month, (which would nearly double their income). It is this permanent help for the poorest which makes the greatest impression. Although nobody with common sense expects this new formula of solidarity to really solve the problems of misery in Italy there is no doubt that by contacts made in this way a very powerful current of public opinion in favor of Christian democracy and against communism can be created. The facts about the other forms of social justice, in fact, can be presented gradually, month by month, after this first move of practical solidarity to those who up to now have only listened to complaints and calumnies. And, more important still, the practical work to be done with these inquiries, these letters to be written, this organization of help for the poorest of the poor will be the practical school of the future Christian leaders who must be capable of working like communist propagandists always on the road and in the houses of the people.